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“JUST CLICK HERE”: A BRIEF GLANCE AT
ABSURD ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS AND THE
LAW FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
MIKE BEISHUIZEN†

ABSTRACT
As e-commerce explodes around the world, consumers’ rights have
been left behind. Before the completion of virtually every transaction
on the Internet, the onus is placed on consumers to read and agree to
an onslaught of terms and conditions. Often hidden in the middle of this
extremely lengthy list of terms are massive exemption and limitation of
liability clauses that deny consumers most if not all of their rights as
“equal” trading partners. The common law principle that all onerous
clauses in a contract need to be brought to the attention of the consumer
for them to be binding seems to have been lost with the invention of the
“click here to agree” button for signing online contracts. As the courts
in Canada have not provided clear guidance on this issue thus far, other
means must be pursued in order to protect consumers from the neartyrannical control of unencumbered electronic standard form contracts
notice as it applies to paper contracts, and then contrast it with the
newer jurisprudence that has refused to apply the principle to electronic
contracts. The reasons for the refusal will be explored, followed by
be applied and strengthened to respond to the increasingly onerous
provisions hidden in electronic contracts. Finally, some other options
for achieving the goal of consumer protection from hidden onerous
stiffer consumer protection legislation domestically, the creation of
international treaties, developing voluntary standards of contracting,
and relying on Internet self-regulation.
†
Mike Beishuizen (B.A., University of British Columbia) will enter his third year at Dalhousie
Law School in September 2005. He would like to thank Professor Devlin, Professor Oguamanam and Steve Beishuizen for their kind support and advice in the writing of this paper.
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE HAS NOT BEEN
APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
1. Paper Contracts
The basic rule in analyzing the legal force of any contract is that if the
parties signed it, they will be bound by it.1 In the widely accepted case
of L’Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd., Lord Scrutton stated that:
[W]hen a document containing contractual terms is signed, then,
in the absence of fraud, or I will add, misrepresentation, the party
signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read
the document or not.2

The potential for misrepresentation is far greater in standard form contracts since there is generally no negotiation or discussion of the terms
between the parties prior to signing.
standard form contracts. Professor Waddams of the University of Toronto stated:
[Several cases subsequent to L’Estrange] suggest that there is a
special onus on the supplier to point out any terms in a printed form
which differ from what the consumer might reasonably expect.
If he fails to do so, he will be guilty of a “misrepresentation by
omission”, and the court will strike down clauses which “differ from
the ordinary understanding of mankind” or (and sometimes this is
the same thing) clauses which are “unreasonable or oppressive”.3

The Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly approved this statement of the
law in Tilden-Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning.4 In addition, Dubin J.A.,
speaking for the majority of the Court in Tilden, elaborated upon the
previous test by concluding that:
1

L’Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (C.A.).
Ibid. at 403.
3
Steven Waddams, comment, (1971) 49 Can. Bar Rev. 578 at 590, cited in Tilden Rent-A-Car
Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400 (Ont. C.A.), 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.) [Tilden
cited to D.L.R.].
4
Tilden, supra note 3.
2
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In many cases the parties seeking to rely on the terms of the contract
know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract
does not represent the true intention of the signer, and that the
party signing is unaware of the stringent and onerous provisions
which the standard form contains. Under such circumstances, I am
of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such terms should
measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and,
in the absence of such reasonable measures, it is not necessary for
the party denying knowledge of such terms to prove either fraud,
misrepresentation or non est factum.5

Since businesses should know that consumers rarely read part or all of a
contract,6 this rule basically means that onerous terms in standard form
contracts will not be binding unless reasonable measures are taken to
bring them to the attention of the consumer. The decision in Tilden has
been generally accepted by courts in most Canadian jurisdictions,7 thus
bringing Canadian common law in line with previous British jurisprudence.8 Tilden has not been overruled and is still an accurate statement
of the law in Canada today for standard form paper contracts. However,
the rule has not been applied to electronic contracts in Canada thus far.
2. Electronic Contracts
i) Rudder v. Microsoft
In the 1999 decision of Rudder v. Microsoft,9 consumers in Ontario attempted to bring a class action lawsuit against Microsoft Network on
behalf of approximately 89,000 Canadians, claiming that Microsoft had
5

Tilden, supra note 3, at 408-409.
See Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1966] 2 All E.R. 61 (H.L.) at 76, where Lord Reid stated, in reference to standard form
contracts, that “the customer has no time to read them, and, if he did read them, he would probably not understand them.”
7
See Delaney v. Cascade River Holidays Ltd. (1983), 44 B.C.L.R. 24 (C.A.), 24 C.C.L.T. 6
(B.C.C.A.) [Delaney]; see also Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v. John Doe (1992), 9 O.R.
(3d) 622 (Gen. Div.).
8
See Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., [1971] 2 Q.B. 163, [1971] 1 All E.R. 686 (C.A.); see
also Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd., [1989] 1 Q.B. 433, [1988]
1 All E.R. 348 (C.A.).
9
[1999] O.J. No. 3778 (Sup. Ct.).
6
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misappropriated their funds. The Ontario Superior Court dismissed the
case as being out of their jurisdiction by upholding the forum selection and choice of law clause in the electronically-signed, “click here to
agree”-type Microsoft Network account-opening agreement. The fairly
typical clause that Rudder failed notice stated:
This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Washington,
U.S.A., and you consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of
courts in King County, Washington, in all disputes arising out of or
relating to your use of MSN or your MSN membership.10

The Court found that even though the clause was not particularly well
print” in a paper contract, and therefore should be given effect. Perhaps
to justify this slight deviation in the law, Winkler J. then stated that “forum selection clauses are generally treated with a measure of deference
by Canadian courts.”11 At best, Rudder does not reject the application
of Tilden in electronic contracts, it merely carves out an exception for
forum selection and choice of law clauses.
However, the decision in Rudder is particularly troubling beyond
of terms because “all of the terms of the agreement [were] displayed in
the same format…in other words, there [was] no
as that term
12
Winkler
J. seems to have missed the point that the size constraints of paper conelectronic contracts. This is irrelevant for notice, however, as the Tilden
rule requires more than simply not
requires that companies take “reasonable measures to draw such terms
to the attention of the other party.”13 To emphasize the difference between these two concepts, it is useful to examine the Microsoft Network
agreement as it exists today.
To sign up for a Microsoft Network account, which is mandatory for
using a Hotmail account, users are required to consent to four contrac10

Ibid. at para. 5.
Supra note 9 at para. 8.
12
Supra note 9 at para. 14.
13
Supra note 3 at 408-409.
11
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tual agreements.14 These agreements form a combined 52 pages of terms
and conditions. Among these terms is a condition that “it is the express
will of the parties that this agreement and all related documents have
been drawn up in English”; another that states “YOU SPECIFICALLY AGREE THAT MICROSOFT SHALL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO OR ALTERATION OF YOUR
TRANSMISSIONS OR DATA”. Finally, of course, there is the all-encompassing exemption of liability clause: “IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT AND/OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR…[followed
by 22 lines totally exempting Microsoft from any conceivable liability,
whatsoever].”15
Of the approximately 2,100 printed lines in these combined agreements, 115 lines are in capital letters and 18 are in bold font. Interestingly enough, essentially the same forum selection and choice of law
clause from Rudder is found inconspicuously in the middle of two of the
four agreements, both times in regular font. No bold font, no capital letters. Surely this is not adequate notice of a clause that in essence denies
consumers the practical right to sue Microsoft. Yet the Rudder decision
the 52-page agreement simply because there are no terms printed in less
than 12-point font.
ii) Kanitz et al. v. Rogers Cable Inc.
The reasoning in Rudder was subsequently followed and expanded upon
by the same Ontario Superior Court in Kanitz et al. v. Rogers Cable
Inc.16 In this case the Court enforced an arbitration clause that was electronically added to a contract after it was signed. The clause effectively
denied consumers the right to pursue a class action lawsuit against Rogers. In his reasons, Nordheimer J. also distinguished the Tilden rule as
ily located by anyone who wishes to take the time to scroll through the
14
See online: Microsoft Network <http://registernet.passport.net>. These agreements are the
Hotmail Service Agreement, MSN Privacy Statement, Passport Terms of Use, and the Passport
Statement of Privacy.
15
“Hotmail Service Agreement,” online: Microsoft Network <https://registernet.passport.net/
images/HMSA_1033.html>.
16
[2002] O.J. No. 665, 58 O.R. (3d) 299 (Sup. Ct.) [Kanitz].
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print on the back of the rent-a-car contract in the Tilden case.”17
What is more disturbing about Kanitz, however, is that Nordheimer
J. found that consumers had been given adequate notice of the afteradded clause simply because the original contract allowed Rogers to
“change, modify, add or remove portions of the agreement”,18 and because notice that amendments were made had been given to consumers.
This notice consisted of a posted a message on the Rogers website and
an email to its customers saying that Rogers had changed the terms of
the agreement. Neither notice gave any further details as to how the
agreement had been altered. Nordheimer J. stated that this constituted

This poses a tremendous burden on consumers, as the same Rogers
End User Agreement that was in contention in Kanitz is a whopping
ten single-spaced pages in length today.19 Considering that the average
consumer has ongoing contracts with one or two email providers, their
Internet service provider, telephone provider, credit card companies,
banks, lease companies and a whole host of other companies, requiring
them to re-read ten or 52 page-long agreements every time a change has
been made to any of them is impractical, unrealistic and inequitable.
The far more equitable alternative would be to simply require that companies provide consumers with a list of the exact amendments that they
have made, drawing special attention to any onerous amendments.
Rudder and Kanitz are the only two cases in Canada thus far that
of the decisions have been adopted for peripheral reasons in other judgments;20 however, due to the limited jurisdictional and precedential
value of Ontario Superior Court decisions, this is not considered to be
settled law in Canada. In contrast, the law is more settled in the United
States.
17

Ibid. at para. 31.
Ibid. at para. 18.
19
“End User Agreement,” online: Rogers Yahoo! Hi-Speed Internet Services <http://na.edit.
client.yahoo.com/rogers/show_static?.form=eua>.
20
See MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2004] B.C.J. No. 1961 at para. 28 (C.A.), 2004
BCCA 473; see also Noble v. Noble, [2002] O.J. No. 4996 at Para. 23 (Sup. Ct.).
18
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iii)

American Jurisprudence

The common law in the United States contains a rule similar to that in
Tilden, although not as stringent, which requires that onerous clauses
be “reasonably communicated” to consumers.21 However, the same dismissal of this requirement in electronic contracts as seen in Canada is
also seen in American jurisprudence. The D.C. Superior Court in Forrest v. Verizon Communications22
tice of a forum selection clause that was written in regular font in the
middle of a 13-page agreement. The Court determined that adequate
notice had been given simply because at the top of the agreement Verizon had written “PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT
CAREFULLY.”23 This decision is probably attributable to the weaker
American notice requirement. For example, a similarly-worded paper
ticket stating, “IMPORTANT PLEASE READ FOLLOWING TERMS
OF PASSAGE CONTRACT” has also been found to adequately notify passengers of onerous terms in a shipping company’s paper-based
agreement.24
Although several courts have hesitantly refused to enforce shrinkwrap agreements25 in the United States,26 none so far has refused to acknowledge terms in an electronic contract because of the lack of notice.27 Therefore, just like in Rudder and Kanitz in Canada, a distinction
21
See Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Lieb v. Royal Caribbean
Cruise Line, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Caspi v. Microsoft Network,
L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (App. Div. 1999), where in a case almost identical in
facts and outcome to Rudder, supra note 9, the forum selection clause in Microsoft Networks’s
User Agreement was deemed to have been reasonably communicated.
22
805 A.2d 1007, 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 509 (D.C. Super. Ct.) [Verizon cited to A.2d].
23
Ibid. at 1010.
24
Melnik v. Cunard Line Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 103, 107 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Cooper v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8054, 1992 WL 137012 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
25
Kevin W. Grierson, “Enforceability of “clickwrap” or “shrinkwrap” agreements common
in computer software, hardware and internet transactions” 106 A.L.R.(5th) 309 at footnote 2

sheet which appears when the user opens packaged hardware or software, which card or sheet
purports to condition use of the hardware or software on the user’s implicit agreement to abide
26
See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1059 (D. Kan.
2000); see also Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 22 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 70 (D. Ariz. 1993).
27
See Grierson, supra
notice in “clickwrap” agreements.
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has been drawn in the United States between notice in paper contracts
and notice in electronic ones. An accurate description of the current law
of electronic contracts in the United States is stated in Verizon, which
notes that “absent fraud or mistake, one who signs [an electronic] contract is bound by a contract which he has an opportunity to read whether
he does so or not.”28
3. Unconscionability
It is important to note that consumers are still protected from exceedingly onerous terms in electronic standard form contracts by the doctrine
of substantive unconscionability. In Robet v. Versus Brokerage Services
Inc. (c.o.b. E*Trade Canada),29 consumers lost money because of an error in E-Trade’s online trading system. The defendant claimed that their
extremely onerous electronic contract absolved them of liability. Using
the principles set out in Tilden, the plaintiff claimed that there was a
Ontario Superior Court found for the plaintiff. However, in doing so it
Tilden
decision in its reasoning. In fact, the Court was extremely vague in describing why it did not allow the exclusion clauses to take effect.
The Court seemed to base its decision on the utter unreasonableness of some of the terms in the contract. Wilkins J. notes sarcastically
that “the wording of clause 16(h) of the agreement is almost such as to
constitute the creation of a license fee for the defendant to be reckless
in its provision of services.”30
culty I have with the case at bar, is that the wording of the contractual
arrangement would appear to be broad enough to encompass almost any
form of activity which might be engaged in by the defendant which, in
effect, could defeat the very purpose and intention of the overall relationship between the parties.”31 According to this reasoning, it seems
that Wilkins J.’s decision is based more on a vague application of the
28
Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Washington, 600 A.2d 813, 817 n.2 (D.C. 1991), as cited
in supra note 22 at 1010.
29
[2001] O.J. No. 1341, [2001] O.T.C. 232 (Sup. Ct.) [Robet].
30
Ibid. at para. 58.
31
Ibid. at para. 61.
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doctrine of substantive unconscionability32 than on the very different
Tilden.33 Soon
after the Robet decision, in 2002 the California District Court explicitly
found substantive unconscionability in the electronically-signed contract in Comb v. Paypal, Inc.34
The Court in Comb found that an arbitration clause that was added
to the agreement after it was signed was substantively unconscionable.
The Court stated that “although it is true that forum selection clauses
generally are presumed prima facie valid, a forum selection clause may
be unconscionable if the “place or manner” in which arbitration is to occur is unreasonable taking into account “the respective circumstances of
the parties.”35
able, the Court found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether the
the decisions in both Robet and Comb serve to demarcate the outer limits of onerous terms that will be allowed in electronic contracts through
the doctrine of unconscionability and without reference to the principle

II. WHY THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE HAS NOT
BEEN APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
has not been applied to electronic contracts in Canada so far. First, there
is an erroneous assumption that consumers have more time to read the
contents of contracts when they are displayed on their home computers.

32

See Fraser Jewellers (1982) Ltd. V. Dominion Electric Protection Co. (1997), 148 D.L.R.
(4th) 496 (Ont. C.A.) for an application of the doctrine of unconscionability in a similar fact
situation.
33
See Zhu v. Merrill Lynch HSBC, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2883, 2002 BCPC 535 [Zhu] where in an
extremely similar case, the British Columbia Provincial Court adopted the outcome of Robet,
yet was equally ambiguous as to whether the result was because of unconscionable terms or
34
35

218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (Cal. D.).
Ibid. at 1177.
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the cases advanced in Canada so far have provided an obvious opportunity to utilize the principle.
1. Rushed Contracts
In the past, Canadian courts have been sympathetic to consumers who
have been rushed into signing standard form contracts with onerous liability release clauses.36 It seems natural to assume that this situation
is effectively avoided when consumers contract electronically from the
explains why the principle in Tilden has not been applied to electronic
contracts.37 However, this assumption is erroneous.
One of the reasons for the Internet’s sweeping success is that it allows rushed consumers to purchase goods and services quickly and easily. Much of the time, if consumers weren’t so rushed, they would be
shopping at stores and malls instead of on the Internet. Companies that
do business online are highly aware of this. In fact, they know that their
This is why most online businesses place their terms and conditions on
a separate page, hyper-linked to the agreement. While hyper-linking the
terms of a contract placates rushed consumers, it should constitute misillusion of a simple contract with no onerous terms. At a very minimum,
the whole contract should be displayed for the consumer before agreement is made. This would at least ensure that rushed consumers do not
entirely miss the fact that there is a long list of terms in the contract.
2. Fine Print
In both Kanitz and Rudder, the Ontario Superior Court found that con-

36

See Tilden, supra note 3; see also Delaney, supra note 7.
George Takash, author of Computer Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), suggested in
an oral conversation with me on December 9th, 2004 that this is probably the main policy reason
as to why Canadian courts have been reluctant to extend the principle in Tilden to electronic
contracts.
37
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print. As discussed earlier, this is not a correct application of the principle in Tilden, which requires that “reasonable measures” be taken to
draw onerous terms to the attention of the other party.38 While not writmeasure” in some circumstances, it certainly cannot mean that it will
be considered reasonable in every circumstance. For example, printing
an onerous term plainly in regular font at the top of a one-page long
contract will usually be seen as being adequate notice of that term. In
contrast, placing that same onerous term in regular font in the middle
of a 52-page agreement can hardly be seen as a reasonable measure to
draw the term to the attention of the other party. The Court in Kanitz
and Rudder failed to make this logical extension, and therefore failed to
understand and apply the precedential logic from Tilden correctly.
3. Lack of Suitable Plaintiffs
The third possible reason why courts in Canada haven’t applied the
principle in Tilden to electronic contracts is because none of the cases
thus far has presented a compelling fact situation to which the courts
might feel sympathetic.
Rudder was a case brought by two recent law school graduates for
75 million dollars. The Court likely presumed that because of their legal
education, these students were not innocent, unequal partners to the bargain as compared to ordinary consumers with no legal training.39 Also,
the Court may have seen the claim for 75 million dollars in damages as a
money and publicity grab rather than a
instance of a powerless
consumer unwittingly consenting to onerous conditions – the situation
which the principle in Tilden was originally developed to remedy.
In Kanitz
the amended End User Agreement. However, the Court simply did not
40
38

because the plaintiff had a

Tilden, supra note 3 at 408-409.
Teresa Scassa & Michael Deturbide, Electronic Commerce and Internet Law in Canada, (Toronto: CCH, 2004) at 14.
40
Supra note 16 at para. 28.
39
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Master’s degree in computer science and should have been familiar with
browsing through websites using the method of trial and error.
In the most blatant dismissal of an action so far, in 1267623 Ontario
Inc. v. Nexx Online Inc.,41 the Ontario Superior Court denied a company
the right to send 200,000 pieces of SPAM per day from their account even
though it was not expressly forbidden in the agreement with their service provider. The question of whether the service provider had given
ently because the Court was so opposed to the idea of letting a spamming company continue to operate that it actually cited an article named
“Why is Spam Bad?”42 in its reasons.
As eCommerce expands to encompass new industries, a new trend
emerging. The evidence of this trend is already apparent in the up-turn
in lawsuits against online brokerages. However, as discussed, the two
cases that have been decided in this area so far have not needed to deal
ments were so unquestionably onerous that they were struck out for a
reason resembling unconscionability.43

III. WHY THE PRINCIPLE IN TILDEN NEEDS TO BE
STRENGTHENED AND APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
ened for use in electronic contracts for four reasons. First, electronic
contracts are generally much lengthier than paper contracts. Second,
there are usually no company representatives available to point out and
clarify onerous terms in electronic contracts prior to signing. Third, as
consumers rarely read or fully understand long contracts, a new approach
is needed to ensure that a true meeting of the minds has taken place. And
fourth, most retail stores doing business on the Internet do not currently

41

45 O.R. (3d) 40, [1999] O.J. No. 2246.
John Levine, “Why is Spam Bad?”, online: Fight Spam on the Internet! <http://spam.abuse.
net/overview/spambad.shtml>.
43
See Robet, supra note 29; also see Zhu, supra note 33.
42
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require that customers explicitly accept any of the terms that are placed
on the transaction, relying instead on the clickwrap button.
1. Longer Electronic Contracts
Electronic contracts are generally longer than paper contracts because
they are less constrained by size and cost, they have less of a psychological effect on consumers, and they need to address potential legal
challenges from multiple legal regimes around the world. The princilonger a contract gets, as it becomes easier for consumers to miss onerous provisions.
they are cheaper than paper contracts. A proper economic analysis of
the costs associated with contracting by paper as opposed to contracting electronically has not been attempted by academics thus far, and is
well beyond the scope of this paper. Yet it is obvious that the ink, paper,
printing, maintenance and storage costs involved with paper contracts is
far greater than the cost of purchasing a small amount of bandwidth and
storage for electronic contracts.
Unconstrained by the prohibitive costs of using long paper contracts,
businesses have generally expanded the size of their contracts for online
users.44 This in turn increases the possibility that terms may be “hidden”
in the contract, and therefore not adequately brought to the attention of
consumers.
The second reason why electronic contracts tend to be longer than
paper contracts is that consumers react differently to the two types of
contracts. Consumers may be shocked out of pursuing a service agreement or making repeat purchases from a store if they are asked to read
and agree to the contents of a 52-page booklet of terms and conditions
that is handed to them. In contrast, most electronic contracts would not
44
See for example Futureshop, whose terms and conditions displayed in their stores are much
shorter than the terms and conditions displayed on their website: “User Agreement,” online:
<http://www.futureshop.ca/informationcentre/en/useagreement.asp> and “Online Policies,”
online: Futureshop <http://www.futureshop.ca/informationcentre/en/onlinepolicies.asp>. Also
compare the terms listed at Chapters-Indigo Books’ stores to the terms listed on their website:
Chapters-Indigo online: <http://www.chapters.indigo.ca/article.asp?Section=home&ArtCode=
legal>.
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have this effect as they hyper-link the terms and conditions to the agreement screen of the transaction. This simple-looking hyper-link obscures
the reality of the often complex and extremely onerous set of terms that
are present in the contract. The illusion created by hyper-linking allows
companies to vastly lengthen their standard electronic contracts without
much consumer backlash. This implicit deception creates a strong need
do not adequately warn consumers that the hyper-link leads to a list of
onerous conditions.
much lengthier than paper contracts is because of the globalized eCommerce marketplace. Most online businesses depend on their contracts to
defend them against legal challenges that may arise under any jurisdiction in the world. Forum and language selection clauses are therefore
common in electronic contracts in addition to generally longer exclusion and limitation clauses.
With the length of electronic contracts expanding and almost completely unconstrained, the principle in Tilden may not be enough to protect consumers against excessively lengthy electronic contracts. This is
because while MSN
onerous term in its 52-page account opening agreement, requiring consumers to read 52 pages just to open an email account is completely
unrealistic and unfair. Therefore, courts should extend the principle of
sively long electronic contracts, which should be deemed unconscionable regardless of the notice given.
The determination of what makes a contract unconscionably long
should be made on a case-by-case basis, with consideration given to the
proportionality between the length of the contract and the complexity of
the transaction. Factors that a court could use to analyse this proportionality could include the total dollar amount of the transaction, the degree
of repetition of terms in the contracts involved, and the inherent complexity of the goods or services provided. To avoid rigidity in applying
this new principle, an objective standard of reasonable proportionality
should be adopted.
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2. No Human Presence
Companies have no human interaction with consumers when they contract online. As electronic contracts typically utilize highly onerous and
Microsoft Network, do not post telephone numbers or email addresses
for customer support services directly on their websites. This creates
obvious problems for contracting in general, because if there is no sales
representative from the company to point out and help clarify the terms
and therefore no agreement. This leads into the third reason why elecmany terms in these contracts are completely inaccessible to the average
consumer.
3. Inaccessible Terms
In 1966, Lord Reid described the reality of standard form contracts in
general by stating that “[usually] the customer has no time to read them,
and, if he did read them, he would probably not understand them.”45 This
statement was later quoted and approved by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Tilden. After making an identical assertion years later, Todd Rakoff
added that “virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of
adhesion has accepted the truth of this assertion, and the few empirical studies that have been done have agreed.”46 This widely accepted
acknowledgement that consumers would not understand the terms of a
contract even if they were to read it is extremely troubling.
create a new legal principle that would strike down any terms in a contract that are clearly inaccessible to consumers who do not have a legal
background. New protection is more necessary now than ever before
in dealing with standardized contracts signed online by unsuspecting
45

Supra note 6 at 76.
Todd D. Rakoff, “Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,” (1983) 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 1174 at 1179.
46
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consumers. This is because electronic contracts have gotten longer and
more complex, and they usually lack the customer-service infrastruccessible terms. The courts have probably not addressed this issue yet
because eCommerce is in its infancy and there have been relatively few
cases before the courts, none of which have yet dealt with a “typical”
powerless plaintiff that the courts could feel truly sympathetic towards.
However, it is inevitable that such plaintiffs will start to appear in court
in contracts that they could not reasonably have been expected to notice
or understand – and at this point, the courts will be forced to address
this issue.

At the moment, consumers make purchases from most of the Canadian
stores that are online without ever being told that a list of terms applies
to the transaction.47 Of course, there are often upwards of ten pages of
terms and conditions that apply to most retail sales online. The burden
is often placed on the consumer to notice that all of these terms are contained in an inconspicuous 6.5-point font hyper-link entitled “Legal Notices and
48
Terms of Use” at the bottom of the page.
Canadian retail stores doing business online probably show this
erous terms because the Canadian courts have failed to apply the principle in Tilden to electronic contracts thus far. If the principle was applied
and adapted to the new circumstances surrounding electronic contracts,
these online stores would be compelled to begin to behave in a more
equitable manner towards consumers.

47

See online: Futureshop <http://www.futureshop.ca>; see also online: Chapters-Indigo <http://
www.chapters.indigo.ca>.
48
See Chapters-Indigo, supra note 44.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE ACTIONS THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO
ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS
Thus far, I have centred the discussion on the role of the courts in providing consumer protection online. However, there are several other means
to achieve this same end. These means include government-imposed
consumer protection, internationally-imposed consumer protection, 3rd

could be taken and the drawbacks that each presents.
1. Government-Legislated Consumer Protection
Various jurisdictions across Canada have opted to enact consumer proper will discuss the relatively progressive Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act.49 The Internet Sales Contract Regulations,50 which were
made under the Act, list the key provisions relating to the notice of terms
Regulations state:
(3) For the purposes of Section 21X of the Act, a supplier shall
disclose the following information to a consumer before entering
into an Internet sales contract with the consumer:

…
(i) the terms, conditions and method of payment

…
(m) any other restrictions, limitations or conditions of purchase that
may apply. 51

The use of the term “shall disclose” is fairly vague. And since the Regulations just came into force in December, 2003, Nova Scotian courts
have not yet determined whether this implies that companies will be
required to explicitly state the provisions of the agreement, or whether
49

R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 92.
N.S. Reg. 91/2002.
51
Ibid. s. 3.
50
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their website.
The more interesting provision in the Act states:
21Z(1) A supplier shall provide a consumer who enters into an
internet sales contract with a copy of the contract in writing or
into.52

The Regulations then follow up by stating:
5(1) A copy of an internet sales contract provided by a supplier
pursuant to Section 21Z of the Act shall include
(a) the information required by Section 3;… 53

In sum, these sections require companies contracting online to send
tion “shall” include all of the items listed in section 3 of the Regulations,
including “(i) the terms, conditions and method of payment” and “(m)
any other restrictions, limitations or conditions of purchase that may
apply.”54
that makes reference to any of the onerous terms in the contract. None of
Chapters.Indigo.ca, Amazon.com, or from Powells.com have made any
implicit or explicit reference to any restrictions, limitations or conditions, or even to general terms of use or terms of sale. Each of these
companies imposes forum selection, arbitration and substantial limitation of liability clauses. These clauses are only accessible by clicking
on the six- to eight-point font “Terms of Use” or “Conditions of Use”
hyper-link at the bottom of the page on each company’s website.55
The main shortcoming of the Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act
is the limited scope of remedies that it provides. The only remedy that
52

Ibid. s. 21Z (1).
Ibid. s. 5(1).
54
Ibid. s. 3.
55
See for example online: Powells <http://www.Powells.com>; online: Chapters-Indigo <http://
www.chapters.indigo.ca>; and online: Amazon at <http://www.amazon.ca>.
53
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the Act makes available to consumers if a seller does not comply with s.
21Z(1) is the right to cancel the contract.56 There are no punitive damages awarded to deter companies from contracting in violation of the
Act as their standard practice. This solution will also be hindered by the
inherent limitation of creating legislation to address problems. It often
takes years to implement legislation due to bureaucratic delays, and it
necessary to make the legislation truly effective.
If the courts in Canada continue to reject the application of principle in Tilden to electronic contracts, governments will be increasingly
gaps in law.
2. Internationally-Imposed Consumer Protection
It is clear that international agreements concerning eCommerce thus far
have been focused almost exclusively on the logistics of establishing
a workable and reliable globalized marketplace on the Internet.57 No
notice in electronic contracts yet. However, as most of the fundamental
logistics of eCommerce have now been worked out, international bodies

3. Third-Party-Created Standards of Contracting
Many international organizations set standards for different industries.
The most widely known and used of these is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). ISO creates standards to make systems
of different industries from computer technology to shoe laces. Thus far,
no international organization has attempted to develop a standard contract for any particular consumer-based industry. The creation of such
56

Supra note 51, s. 6(1)(a).
See the work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org>; see also UNCITRAL, “Online:
Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001),” online: <http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/
57
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standards, however, may be a partial solution to the problem of heavily
onerous electronic contracts.
If standards were set for the format, basic contents, and allowable
provisions in contracts in a certain industry, companies may choose to

tables of contents at the top of electronic contracts. Such a standard
would change the way contracts are viewed online by taking advantage of the Internet’s inherent hierarchical structure. Some of the previously discussed problems with hyper-linking could easily be avoided
by naming the hyper-links appropriately. For example, naming a hyonerous exclusion clause within; whereas naming the same hyper-link
“X company is excluded from liability for doing Y activity” would give
Companies would adopt contractual standards to conform to industry norms, eliminate uncertainty about the legality of its own contracts,
and to vastly reduce the legal costs involved in independently creating
ardization because with a quick glance at the ISO symbol at the top of an
electronic contract they would know that there are no unconscionable
terms, and no onerous clauses “hiding” in the middle of the contract. If
applied correctly, standards would mitigate the fact that most consumers
do not read contracts by effectively guaranteeing fair contracts.
The limitations of voluntary standards are obvious. Without adequate
incentives and pressure, industry will not likely create these standards
on their own. Also, because they are voluntary standards, there would
be no substantial penalty for breaching the standard, or for failing to
adopt the standard at all.
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4. Internet Self-Regulation
Since none of the above-mentioned methods have come even close to
effectively protecting the rights of consumers since the dawn of the Internet, market forces in some industries have created an extremely effective system of self-regulation. The pioneering example of this system
is eBay.58
eBay works on a system of feedback between buyers and sellers.
Everyone is required to open an account before they can take part in the
marketplace of eBay. Every time a transaction takes place on eBay, the
seller and buyer have the option to rate one another. Users can view the
ratings and comments that every other user has received in the past. In
short, if a seller on eBay tries to hold a buyer to onerous terms without
ers will see this rating, and may choose to buy from another, who would
almost perfectly elastic marketplace.
eBay also provides a type of standard for sellers that consumers can
trust. All sellers that meet certain criteria and obtain a 98% or higher satisfaction rating from buyers during the previous month are designated
as a “Power Seller.”59 This designation works well to achieve the goal of
fair trading in two different ways. First, it motivates sellers to act fairly
in all of their transactions to obtain the standard. And second, it almost
guarantees that buyers will get a fair deal with a contract that is absent
of hidden onerous terms.
In sum, eBay’s system of mutual feedback works extremely well in
regulating transactions for consumer goods, and has been reproduced
in many other marketplaces on the Internet.60 However, no such system
has been implemented to protect consumers from service contracts on
the Internet. As service contracts are rapidly expanding on the Internet,
especially in the banking, insurance and gambling industries, other action needs to be taken to protect consumers in these areas.
58

See online: eBay <http://www.ebay.com>.
See online eBay <http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsell/welcome.html> for further details about the Power Seller system.
60
See for example online: BizRate <http://www.bizrate.com>.
59
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V. CONCLUSION
is very real, and is getting worse as contracts lengthen over time and
eCommerce expands to encompass newer and more sophisticated industries. With no human customer-service representatives available online,
powerless consumers are often left alone to decipher hugely complex
contracts that may take lawyers hours to understand.
This is a large-scale problem that cannot be adequately addressed
by any one corrective measure. In light of Canadian courts’ refusal to
far, increased attention must be paid to examining alternative means to
achieve the same goal of consumer protection. Introducing domestic
consumer protection legislation and creating an international consensus
on consumer protection online could effectively address the problem,
but these methods are typically frustrated and hindered by bureaucratic
tions. Another solution is to pressure industry to create voluntary standards. This could be effective, but this effort would be limited by industry
motivation and the inherent inability for anyone to enforce these standards. Finally, Internet self-regulation has proven to be quite an effective
and promising method of ensuring an equitable marketplace for goods
purchased online; however, this method has thus far failed to respond to
the rapidly emerging marketplace for online services.
It is clear that none of these solutions taken alone can adequately
protect consumers from hidden onerous terms in online transactions
in every circumstance. However, using a combination of these different approaches and techniques could remedy the problem effectively.
Therefore, until Canadian courts start applying a more rigorous and exmulti-faceted approach will be the only way to ensure that consumers
will be protected from onerous provisions hidden in absurd electronic
contracts in the future.

